

Special Economic Zones

EXAMINING THEIR IMPACT ON THE REFUGEE CRISIS IN JORDAN

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At the Nasib border crossing from Syria to Jordan in 2012, Ahmad knew that his family was taking a new direction. Ahmad was just a small child at the time, but even he knew the weight of these steps. As they made this trip, they gradually left the lush city of Homs and found themselves amid the immense Jordanian desert. The bleak landscape surrounding them seemed to mirror the future that lay ahead. Fleeing the violence behind, they disavowed their own government and registered as refugees, surrendering many freedoms they once held. One of these freedoms was mobility, and they were placed in the Zaatari refugee camp for three years, where they could no longer work for their own livelihood.

Two years later, Ahmad's family was ripped apart when his father was arrested and deported to Syria for working illegally in agriculture, the job he had always done in Homs. When I met the remainder of this family in 2016, they had not heard from him and could only imagine his fate in Syria. Regulations have since changed so men like him can work, but the family remains traumatized from their experience. None of the three individuals in this household who could finally work legally were providing for the rest of the family. Instead, they were processing an eviction from their home since they could not afford the rent. The \$250 of aid this family of six received each month was not enough for the necessities of life, and they were losing what little remained.

Their story is just one that illustrates how many refugees are trapped amid a failing system, which is changing the landscape of Jordan. The flow of as


many as 1.3 million Syrians has turned Jordan into the host of more refugees per capita than any other country. Individuals and families depend on hand-outs from government agencies yet are held at a standard of living barely survivable. In Jordan, refugees receive assistance from numerous sources, including the World Food Program (WFP), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), and rent subsidy programs, to name some of the largest. Stephen Allen, former field coordinator for UNICEF in Jordan and current team lead with United States Agency for International Development, described these "to be a minimum to keep you from starving."¹

Even still, in September 2015 the WFP ran out of funds, and for an entire month a quarter-million refugees did not receive the cash they had budgeted for.² It is not out of maliciousness that refugees live in these conditions; there is simply not enough money to support their immense needs.³ As Table 1 points out, there is a continual shortage in the requested funding for the Syrian crisis. Even worse, the shortage of funding has steadily been increasing, a trend that can be seen not only in this region but also across the world. Figure 1 shows the increasing worldwide gap, from a 25 percent shortage in 2009 to a 50 percent shortage in 2014. Donors are giving increasing amounts each year, but they cannot keep pace with the needs. These two issues—refugees living in appalling conditions and deficiencies in the aid needed to sustain them—are symptomatic of greater flaws in the current global

Table 1. UNHCR Syria Region Funding Appeal and Receipts

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP) Request	348,340,163	1,409,812,466	2,256,199,013	2,893,444,593	3,193,669,810
SHARP Received	215,915,475	959,284,768	1,144,692,703	1,231,959,283	1,556,211,223
Unmet Amount	132,424,688	450,527,698	1,111,506,310	1,661,485,310	1,637,458,587
Syria Regional Refugee Response Plan (RRP) Request	487,983,480	2,981,640,112	3,740,654,701	4,319,944,557	4,539,342,335
RRP Received	373,549,188	2,180,971,363	2,360,709,767	2,769,657,418	2,712,353,379
Unmet Amount	114,434,292	800,668,749	1,379,944,934	1,550,287,139	1,826,988,956
Total Request	836,323,643	4,391,452,578	5,996,853,714	7,213,389,150	7,733,012,145
Total Received	589,464,663	3,140,256,131	3,505,402,470	4,001,616,701	4,268,564,602
Total Unmet	246,858,980	1,251,196,447	2,491,451,244	3,211,772,449	3,464,447,543
Percentage Funded	70%	72%	58%	55%	55%

Source: Compiled from UNHCR Syria regional appeal documents (numbers in USD).

Figure 1. UNHCR Global Funding Appealed and Receipts

Source: Compiled from UNHCR global appeal documents (numbers in millions USD).

institution for handling refugees. This whole system may have been largely functional up until now, but today there are more refugees (21.5 million) than at any point since the UNHCR's inception after World War II. In the face of this crisis, Jordan has taken major

steps to reshape the way refugees are supported.⁴ Employment lies at the heart of these changes. Should employment be open to refugees in their host country, and if so, what is the best way to implement this? These are the questions this research seeks to answer.

A New System

Jordan has the potential to initiate a new paradigm for the global system. Bryn Boyce, deputy director of programs for the International Rescue Committee in Jordan, stated, “Jordan is definitely poised to take a first in the history of refugee crises kind of position when it comes to it. There is still a lot of uncertainty and unknowns to open up these opportunities to refugees and have them take it, but it is unprecedented potential.”⁵ The opportunities Boyce points to are the recent efforts to legalize employment for refugees. Ahmad El-Zubi, CEO of Naua for Sustainable Development and former director of research for the Jordanian Investment Commission, spoke to the government’s reasoning as they began to open more doors for refugees: “There is economic pressure, there is unemployment, there are all these services they require and then it is quite difficult to associate those needs to match with those people that need them.” These are all dilemmas that have come up through government control of the refugees’ lives. The solution: “Put these refugees as active members of the economy, so that they can create value, as opposed to being a cost.”⁶ The data presented in this paper, gathered through interviews in Jordan, support such a hypothesis.

The changes to legalize employment that are beginning in Jordan are largely due to the proposals of two Oxford scholars, Alexander Betts and Paul Collier. In “Help Refugees Help Themselves,” an article published in *Foreign Affairs*, they argue:

Jordan offers one place to begin. There, a reconsidered refugee policy would integrate displaced Syrians into specially created economic zones, offering Syrian refugees employment and autonomy, incubating businesses in preparation for the eventual end of the civil war in Syria, and aiding Jordan’s aspirations for industrial development. Such an approach would align the interests of a host state with the needs of refugees and might prove broadly applicable to refugee crises elsewhere.⁷

This creates the foundation of their argument; whatever the solution, it must (1) benefit the host

nation, (2) provide immediate much-needed support for refugees themselves, and (3) ensure the viability of a resolution to the crisis. To add to the body of research surrounding their theories, this paper tests their first two points. Betts and Collier’s third point is beyond the purview of this paper, as it would begin looking at such disparate (albeit interconnected) factors that have kept the conflict in Syria running.

Much of the global community has stepped behind Betts and Collier’s theory that special economic zones (SEZs) will provide the necessary relief for the nation of Jordan and the refugees hosted in its borders. The Supporting Syria and the Region Conference, held in London in February 2016, made this clear. Betts and Collier majorly inspired the product of this conference, the Jordan Compact, which develops policies to spur the growth of SEZs across Jordan. Specifically, the compact exempts 52 product groups from taxes and tariffs into the European market if they are produced in 18 specified industrial zones across Jordan.⁸ In exchange, Jordan has relaxed restrictions and is pursuing the placement of at least 200,000 Syrians in these new openings. Additionally, the European Union is promoting private investment in Jordan and supports the nation through direct grants and loans.

With the ongoing implementation of these theories, many groups are researching their impact or making similar proposals for ways to alleviate the crisis. The World Bank is one such group, focusing on the labor market in its research. One of its products is *The Welfare of Syrian Refugees: Evidence from Jordan and Lebanon*, a book its researchers published. The World Bank’s involvement is largely due to a \$300 million project, focusing on “labor market reforms—in addition to investment climate reforms and investment promotion activities aiming at attracting investments and fostering job creation for Syrian refugees and Jordanians.”⁹ Its proposals aim to alleviate the problems that families such as Ahmad’s face in the system today. Susan Razzaz, at the helm of this World Bank project in Jordan, said they looked at creating 200,000 jobs but have since acknowledged the “government doesn’t make jobs; but what the government can be held responsible for is work permits, so that is where the focus lies.”¹⁰

Another similar project, “The Socio-Economic Impact of Syrian Refugees on Jordan: Turning Challenges into Opportunities,” looks at the impact on the Jordanian economy, again with special emphasis on labor markets and the role of SEZs. Myrthe Toppen, one researcher for this project, described the goal as “focusing on the integration of Syrian refugees into the manufacturing sector” and looking at “how the Syrian refugees can be leveraged as a labor force to help Jordan establish a strong industrial hub and foster its manufacturing sector.”¹¹

In Jordan specifically, they call for the international community to give more aid for implementing Jordan’s \$2.67 billion response plan.

Many other proposals examine what is necessary for alleviating this crisis. Scholars with the Brookings Institution called for the United States to “build a coalition for the resettlement of refugees, starting with an increase in its own intake” and to “leverage support for the front-line states—Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon—by focusing on helping these countries support refugee populations in becoming more self-reliant.”¹² In Jordan specifically, they call for the international community to give more aid for implementing Jordan’s \$2.67 billion response plan.¹³ Lucas Oesch gives a succinct argument for “mobility as a solution,” contending that so long as borders are open for refugees to enter and exit their host country at will, they can maintain their standard of living more thoroughly.¹⁴ No single project or proposal looking at the livelihood for Syrian refugees expects to solve the entire crisis,

but each of these researchers have provided ways they believe the system can be improved.

This paper weighs the theoretical arguments Betts and Collier put forth as measured out through qualitative and quantitative research performed on the ground in Jordan. First, it looks at the impact that SEZs have on Jordan’s economy. Second, the research looks at the impact they have on refugees’ lives. This paper will then look at how this compares to what Betts and Collier proposed in their acclaimed article. The information used for this analysis comes from interviews with refugees and leaders in humanitarian assistance in Jordan. Finally, this paper concludes with suggestions for where continued research is needed.

Jordanian Industry

Betts and Collier lead off their discussion of the benefits to Jordan by stating that “the country’s leaders have long hoped to make the difficult transition to a manufacturing economy . . . the refugee crisis offers Jordan the chance to make this transition.”¹⁵ Baseem Al Refeai, Jordanian national director for Global Sign Right in Jordan, a logistical support agency for humanitarian organizations, stated that many members of the “Syrian society are technical, they are professional in lots of things. We can share this land. Sharing all the offers, knowledge, and experience by building Jordan.”¹⁶ This is in agreement to what Betts and Collier put forward, that “Syrians would not be in competition with Jordanians for existing jobs: their presence would be jobs-generating.” Many Syrians bring complementary skills with them, such as the wealth of agricultural expertise they have traditionally brought to Jordan or experience supplementing Jordanian construction by performing the high-skilled electrical, plumbing, and stone-masonry work.¹⁷

Yet, Al Refeai does not fully agree with the SEZs because he has serious reservations about how they function in practice. As a partner in founding Al Hassan Industrial Estate, one of the largest in Jordan,¹⁸ Al Refeai recognizes the success that these “industrial clusters” can have by sharing infrastructure, utilities,

and the other necessary factors for successful manufacturing businesses. The economy of scale in these areas can be an enormous boon to development. The special treatment that Betts and Collier recommend “through financial incentives and trade concessions” is where the issues arise, as they could further entrench corruption in Jordan.¹⁹

Including refugees who are working, the Jordanian government has said more than 1.4 million foreign workers are in Jordan, an enormous proportion in a population of less than seven million.

“It [corruption] is a big problem here in Jordan,” Al Refeai says, and the change must be made “to protect the system and not to protect the person.”²⁰ Transparency International ranks Jordan 48 out of 100 on their Corruption Perceptions Index, specifically stating “that investment is also hindered in the country as government fails to address petty forms of corruption such as bribery and nepotism.”²¹ It is not hard to see how these “petty forms of corruption” could be some of the most detrimental when discussing economic growth and specifically SEZs.²² The financial incentives, such as import guarantees, low tariffs, minimal income tax, or government subsidies, could all become pieces in grander corruption schemes. The Heritage Foundation also points out this culture of corruption in advancing business interests, stating that it is “endemic in Jordan.”²³

Questionable business practices can be found in the Industrial Estates, which have been in Jordan for several years. The first, founded just outside Amman, began in 1984. Al Hassan began in 1991 and was designated as the first qualified industrial zone in the world in 1998.²⁴ Yet, for all the industry in these locations, they have not been quite the boon to Jordanian society as would be expected. Of the roughly 16,600 jobs in Al Hassan, more than 14,000 are held by foreign workers, primarily from Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Egypt, the Philippines, and other labor exporting countries.²⁵ Many of the factories in this estate are neither run by Jordanians nor owned by Jordanian companies. Ahmad El-Zubi, from the Jordanian Investment Commission, explained how foreign companies will establish a factory in Jordan, import semifinished products into the country, perform a single value-added process to use Jordan’s advantageous trade deals, and move their product into other markets. The international firm walks away with profits, the foreign workers have jobs, and Jordan receives little because of the tax breaks in these zones.

Why does Jordan not benefit from these deals? Surely, it is because Jordan does not have a realistic comparative advantage in this industry. To remain competitive in the global market, especially in the textiles industry, Jordan depends on the cheap labor. Jordan itself cannot supply this cheap labor without this constant flow of foreign workers. Including refugees who are working, the Jordanian government has said more than 1.4 million foreign workers are in Jordan, an enormous proportion in a population of less than seven million.²⁶ Susan Razzaz pointed out that this dependency on foreign labor and the lack of a comparative advantage means Jordan will not benefit much from large investments in this manufacturing sector. Nor would simply opening labor to agricultural work help, which uses subsidized (and immensely scarce) water and primarily foreign labor. Jordan needs to “focus on higher value added things. More technology intensive things that require skills,” such as highly specific subsets in agriculture or more advanced manufacturing and assembly. “Let go of the garment sector,” Razzaz said.²⁷

Refugees, Incentives, and Disincentives

Betts and Collier suggest that “SEZs have developed a poor reputation among human rights activists, who fear that they enable the exploitation of low-wage workers. Yet there is no reason why the development of such zones cannot be consistent with ethical labor practices.”²⁸ If the standard of living for refugees in Jordan is to increase and they are to benefit from changes in the structure of these zones, then labor practices will be important.

What are the current ethical practices in the Jordanian Industrial Estates, where the SEZ policies are beginning to be implemented? From 2009 until 2016, Jordanian garments were listed on the US Department of Labor’s “List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor.”²⁹ Many laborers who were forced to produce these garments in the Industrial Estates worked up to 15 hours per day, had their passports confiscated, and lived in deplorable conditions. All this happened after they chose to come based on deceptive information they received when they were hired. Only in the most recent edition was the sector removed from the Department of State’s list, and still, there are serious reservations of the labor practices in these areas. Labor organizations, such as Better Work Jordan and the General Trade Union of Workers in Textile, Garment and Clothing Industries, have continued to monitor and investigate the living conditions for workers and the rights they have while on the job.

These cases arise as the companies attempt to maintain their sole advantage—low costs of labor. To keep costs low, they provide little for living conditions and have their employees work long hours. This will not change by introducing new or expanded SEZs because low labor costs will continue to make Jordan’s labor costs competitive in the industry. In Al Hassan, at the time of this writing, there are more than 100 reports of trafficking from these textile factories, worker strikes because of unjust treatment by their management, and investigations into the dormitories for employees.³⁰ Some of the most recent investigations were performed in December 2016, as reports showed systematic failures in many

Table 2. Reasons Refugees Gave for Not Working

Reason	Number
Not Qualified for Available Positions	3
Distance	5
Family	7
Schooling	2
Fear	8
Not Satisfied	3
Not Enough Pay	7
Health	3
N = 27	

Source: Author.

companies’ facilities to promote the health and safety of their employees.

Finding refugees to fill the positions that are opening up in the development zones is difficult. When several hundred Syrians receiving humanitarian aid from a nongovernmental organization (NGO) I was working with in the city of Mafraq were presented with 50 openings in a garment factory, only 25 positions were filled. Their denial to work in these positions shows the very real barriers to working in these zones, some of which were already discussed.

Low Pay. One of the most common reasons refugees gave when asked why they were not able to work was that the salary was not high enough. As Table 2 shows, of 27 refugees who were not working, seven felt that pay was a major factor in this decision, or 26 percent of the sample. The average pay of 190 JD per month for employees in SEZs is less than some of them received in aid. This pay may be high enough for foreign workers who come to Jordan and remit their salary abroad where the cost of living is much lower, but for Syrian families living in Jordan, this is not a sufficient wage. The minimum expenditure basket (calculated by measuring the cost of all necessary nonfood items) in Jordan is 198 JD monthly for a Syrian family of six (the average family size).³¹ This is in addition to

the bare minimum of 120 JD this family would need for food.³² That almost 90 percent of the workers in the textile industry of Al Hassan are foreign nationals and not Jordanians shows that the industry does not pay a high enough wage for those who have their families in Jordan.

Mismatched Positions. The developing SEZs have struggled to find refugees who will fill the many positions available. As Sanal Kumar, the chairman and managing director of Classic Fashion Apparel Industry Ltd. Co. (the largest clothing manufacturer in Jordan), noted in a meeting, “Although there has been a lot of talk and excitement employing Syrians in the garment sector, the on-ground situation is bleak.”³³

For those refugees who are able to work, SEZs have to compete with other industries or opportunities available to them. For some, this is working informally; for others, it is in agriculture or other manual labor positions in open sectors. These other opportunities generally attract Syrians because they frequently pay more and are much more flexible.³⁴ In 2009, the most recent year for which data are available, 92 percent of foreign workers in the manufacturing industries were earning less than 150 JD per month. For agricultural workers, just over 80 percent were within this salary range, while with every other industry recorded (service workers, sales workers, clerks, etc.), the typical salary was much higher for foreign workers.³⁵ Working with these manufacturers also requires a one-year contract, something many refugees are hesitant to step into while their future is so uncertain.³⁶ The aforementioned living conditions and environment of many of the SEZs are also a significant factor for some; even if they were to make an additional income, it would not outweigh the environment of the zones. The standard of living in these areas is often lower than they might have in their current communities.

The work that Better Work Jordan, the labor unions, the Ministry of Labor, and other NGOs have accomplished has made these occupations much better than they were even a decade ago, but they still have not reached a level to attract the right workers. The labor force that these SEZs can draw from is not one that the Syrian population fits neatly into.

One man, Samir, faced an experience disincentive, or the inability to use the skills that he already holds. He has experience running his own tailor shop at home, yet he can receive only a simple manufacturing job in textiles in these zones. Other potential workers cannot make it to the zones because they must take care of their families at home. This is the case with many of the younger ladies in the sample, as they have the necessary skills for these factories, yet they cannot leave either their children or the older members of their family for whom they are caring. The positions in these SEZs are not well catered to these varied groups of individuals that make up a large proportion of the total Syrian population in Jordan.

Legal Environment. Table 3 shows that many of the refugees who are working have chosen to obtain employment other than through the legal route with work permits. Of all those working or volunteering from this sample, 39 percent were doing so illegally. Ahmad’s father was just one of many who was willing to take the risk of working in the informal market. The pay in the SEZs must compete with other positions where refugees can work in construction, agriculture, or numerous other fields—positions that many have prior experience in. The Jordanian government has pointed out that of the 2.9 million foreign citizens in Jordan, as many as one million are working illegally.³⁷ In a population of just 6.6 million Jordanians, this would be comparable to twice the entire population of Texas working illegally in the United States. The incentives to work in the legal industries are just not enough, so many have found other avenues for employment. The government has attempted to reduce the size of this informal labor market by simplifying the work permit process and more strictly enforcing the current laws (Ahmad’s father was one of many deported for this reason), but with such an enormous market, the government has only been able to chip away at the edges.

To others it was a fear of changing regulations—that they might lose their assistance or be punished once again for returning to work, as was the case with Ahmad’s family. Another pernicious perception among refugees was that by going to work they might

Table 3. Legal Status of Working Refugees

Legal	10
Informal	9
Volunteering	4
N = 23	

Source: Author.

lose their ability to resettle in another country.³⁸ Ibrahim and his family were one family I met that was waiting for the final word on their resettlement in the United States. With such high stakes, they did not want to jeopardize this by beginning to work, even though it was legalized. They were in this limbo for close to a year. Many refugees perceive that employment is taken into account for resettlement, so they do not pursue employment.

Reshaping Industry and Investment in Jordan

With the implementation of Betts and Collier's theories taking place through the new agreements fleshed out in the Jordan Compact, I could see where they fell short of expectations throughout Jordan. Regarding the actual impact on the local economy, if Jordan does

build up these SEZs and brings in foreign investors in simple manufacturing, the SEZs and foreign investors will not clearly benefit Jordan's future development. As the evidence in Table 4 displays, the manufacturing sector has always relied heavily on these large pools of foreign labor. Roughly 50 percent of all permits issued to foreign workers have been for low-skilled manufacturing positions. The new pools of Syrian labor would only replace these groups if they were to work in SEZs. In the optimal resolution to this crisis, Syrians will return home, leaving Jordan right back where it started, with industries that are not employing or benefiting Jordanians themselves. Syrians' presence will not be jobs generating if they are simply foisted into these low-skilled industries.

Neither workers nor employers have the right incentives. The "financial incentives" will not effectively create new jobs in Jordan. Industrial leaders point out that they do not provide necessary support. The managers of Al Durra Foods, a major manufacturer in the Al Hassan Industrial Estate, point out that their primary market is not in the European Union. Without the necessary demand, there is no reason to use the new rules-of-origin deals from the Jordan Compact, which grant them access to that market. The same is true for many manufacturers, and for those others who could benefit, they often do not fully understand the impact and value of these trade

Table 4. Work Permits Issued and Foreign Workers in Manufacturing

Year	Work Permits Issued	Foreign Workers in Manufacturing	Year	Work Permits Issued	Foreign Workers in Manufacturing
1994	42,275	N/A	2004	218,756	110,178
1995	42,275	N/A	2005	260,357	128,889
1996	42,976	N/A	2006	289,724	N/A
1997	116,533	N/A	2007	313,962	154,974
1998	114,000	N/A	2008	303,325	132,372
1999	154,197	69,882	2009	335,707	134,616
2000	110,580	51,504	2010	298,341	N/A
2001	136,573	66,111	2011	280,263	N/A
2002	127,181	57,804	2012	279,798	N/A
2003	148,351	67,060	2013	286,197	N/A

Source: Ministry of Labor, "Jordanian Labor Market," <http://www.mol.gov.jo/Pages/viewpage.aspx?pageID=185>.

deals.³⁹ The culture of corruption that Transparency International and the Heritage Foundation point out could also be detrimental. Adding these zones will likely instigate higher levels of rent-seeking, corruption, and nepotism, which would significantly dampen Jordan's long-term growth.⁴⁰

Again, the CEO of the largest clothing manufacturer in Jordan pointed out, "There needs to be mobilization forces committed to bringing Syrians to the industry as it shouldn't be the role of the employers. The concept needs to be changed from a CSR [corporate social responsibility] model to a business model."⁴¹ Betts and Collier's theory rests on the belief that SEZs will benefit all parties, including businesses, Jordanians, and Syrians. But the changes being made to implement these theories are forcing businesses to approach this crisis not as partners with the Syrians, sharing in the benefits from these pools of labor, but only out of charity. They surrender profits to assist the refugees through employment. In hearing from the leaders in the food and textiles industries, both believed that stipulating where these companies must function to receive this freer trade, specifying the percentages of workers they must hire, and limiting their production to certain sectors have not helped them grow.

The leads for the agencies implementing these new programs point out that this program depends on foreign investment coming in. Bryn Boyce and Susan Razzaz said that increased investment was the necessary next step if the deals made through the London Compact were to be meaningfully implemented. But, international firms must see a benefit to opening business in Jordan and shift capital to meet this opportunity. Even with the new incentives that SEZs are meant to provide, the process contains too many challenges. Ahmad El-Zubi pointed out that "it wasn't due to lack of interest. . . . It was due to overlapping regulations that Jordan would lose some really large investors."⁴² Razzaz said the same, that the uncertainty and ambiguity of regulations make it difficult. Adding in another exception, another set of rules and regulations with the SEZs, has only served

to complicate this process further. Investors are not looking for a break or an exception to the rule; they are simply looking for an environment where they understand the rules and have faith that they will remain consistent.

Summary and Suggestions

The refugee system in Jordan and around the world needs a major change. It is unsustainable. Betts and Collier proposed their new model, to use SEZs to employ the refugees themselves, which has since been implemented in Jordan, but as the implementation moves forward, it has shown serious flaws and is not the needed resolution. The system depends on foreign investment that is unlikely to continue, is set up in such a way that it does not alleviate the barriers to work that the refugees face, and does not provide the country with the development it needs.

Continued research into the proper route for the refugee system ought to include the same features that Betts and Collier analyze; namely, support for the refugees, support for the host nation, and a quicker resolution to the crisis. The proper response will surely include as a part of it the full and open employment of refugees. But the specificities of this have yet to be thoroughly researched and analyzed. In the research done for this paper, many refugees discussed their biggest barriers to employment, but a comprehensive statistical analysis of what these are is necessary to analyze how the system should be reworked.

Hope can be found in the steps the nation of Jordan has already taken. A more holistic approach to this refugee crisis is in process. With its next steps, this country, which has had a history of hosting refugees since its first days, has the potential to provide an example to the rest of the world, a world overwhelmed with refugees it cannot serve effectively. How exactly this change will look, and what steps Jordan needs to take, have yet to be determined. But surely this new system is beginning, and we all have the opportunity to see it at its earliest stages.

Notes

1. Stephen Allen (UNICEF and USAID), in interview with the author, Amman, Jordan, September 2016.
2. *Guardian*, “Lack of Funds: World Food Programme Drops Aid to One-Third of Syrian Refugees,” September 4, 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/05/lack-of-funds-world-food-programme-drops-aid-to-one-third-of-syrian-refugees>.
3. Some would suggest that the government intends to keep refugees in poor living conditions to prevent them from becoming too comfortable and settling for the long term. However, these are generally unsubstantiated claims.
4. Jordan’s crisis is only exacerbated by the 350,000 refugees from Palestine, Yemen, Iraq, and other countries in addition to the Syrians they are hosting. See Jordan Department of Statistics, “Distribution of Non-Jordanian Population Living in Jordan by Sex, Nationality, Urban/ Rural and Governorate,” 2015.
5. Bryn Boyce (co-chair, Livelihood Working Group), interview with the author, Amman, Jordan, November 2016.
6. Ahmad El-Zubi (director, Naua for International Development), interview with the author, Amman, Jordan, October 2016.
7. Alexander Betts and Paul Collier, “How to Help Refugees Help Themselves,” *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2015, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/levant/2015-10-20/help-refugees-help-themselves>.
8. Supporting Syria and the Region Conference, “The Jordan Compact,” 2016.
9. Meriem Ait Ali Slimane and Susan Razzaz, “A New Approach to the Refugee Crisis. A Win-Win Case for Jordanians and Syrian Refugees,” *World Bank*, September 30, 2016, <http://blogs.worldbank.org/arabvoices/new-approach-refugee-crisis>.
10. Susan Razzaz (contractor, World Bank), interview with the author, Amman, Jordan, November 2016.
11. Myrthe Toppen (researcher, Identity Center), interview with the author, Amman, Jordan, October 2016.
12. Michael Ignatieff et al., “The Refugee and Migration Crisis: Proposals for Action, U.N. Summit 2016,” Brookings Institution, September 12, 2016, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-refugee-and-migration-crisis-proposals-for-action-u-n-summit-2016/>.
13. This would be in addition to the UNHCR funding appeals displayed in Table 1.
14. Lucas Oesch, “Mobility as a Solution,” *Forced Migration Review* 1, no. 47 (September 2014): 48, <http://www.fmreview.org/syria/oesch.html>.
15. Betts and Collier, “How to Help Refugees Help Themselves.”
16. Baseem Al Refeai (director, Global Sign Right), in discussion with author, Zarqa, Jordan, October 2016.
17. Allen, interview.
18. Baseem was a member of the Planning Committee when Al Hassan Industrial Estate was established in the 1990s.
19. Betts and Collier, “How to Help Refugees Help Themselves.”
20. Al Refeai, discussion.
21. Kinda Hattar, “Middle East and North Africa: A Very Drastic Decline,” *Transparency International*, January 25, 2017, https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/mena_a_very_drastic_decline.
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35. Migration Policy Center—CARIM South, “Non-Jordanian Workers Holding Work Permits by Job Category and Monthly Earning,” 2017.
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38. These responses are all documented in Table 2.
39. Al Durra Food Industries Management, interview with the author, Ramtha, Jordan, December 2016; and Ahmad El-Zubi (director, Naua for International Development), interview with the author, Amman, Jordan, October 2016.
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